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By Thomas Polityka*
From Poe to Roe: A Bickelian View
Of the Abortion Decision-Its
Timing and Principle
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1961 the United States Supreme Court in Poe v. Ullman'
refused to reach the merits of a suit brought by a couple, a house-
wife and a doctor under the Connecticut Declaratory Judgments Act
to test the constitutionality of that state's anti-birth-control stat-
utes.2 Relying on the concept of desuetude,3 the Court felt the
plaintiffs had not demonstrated they were in immediate danger of
prosecution and absent such a showing, the Court refrained from a
decision on the merits.
In 1965 the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut4 reached
the constitutional merits of the Connecticut statutes challenged in
Poe. Unlike the earlier case, this constitutional challenge was raised
as a defense to a prosecution under the statutes. On the merits,
* B.A., 1971, and J.D., 1973, University of Nebraska. Member of the
Nebraska State Bar Association and the American Bar Association.
1. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
2. The statutes challenged provided:
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or in-
strument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be
fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than
sixty days nor more than one year or both fined and impris-
oned.
CoNN. GEN. STuA. AN. § 53-32 (1958), 'epealed, Pub. Act 828, § 214
(1969).
Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or
commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted
and punished as if he were the principal offender.
CoNN. GEN. SrAT. Ax. § 54-196 (1958), repealed, Pub. Act 828, § 214
(1969).
3. Generally speaking, this is a concept by which statutes which have
not been enforced for a long period of time become nullified or re-
pealed by the fact of their continued disuse.
4. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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the Court held that the statutes were an unconstitutional infringe-
ment on the right of privacy guaranteed by the United States Con-
stitution.
In 1971 the Supreme Court in United States v. Vuitch 5 held that
the District of Columbia statute which made abortions illegal "un-
less the same were done as necessary for the preservation of the
mother's life or health" was not unconstitutionally vague. The
case was before the Court on an appeal by the government from
the dismissal by a federal district court of an indictment against
the defendant.
In 1973 the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade,7 an appeal from a
grant of declaratory relief, held that a Texas statute prohibiting
abortions unless "procured or attempted by medical advice for the
purpose of saving the life of the mother ' 8 was unconstitutionally
overbroad. The Court held that the right of personal privacy is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy and that the state of Texas was unable to show a com-
pelling interest in forbidding abortions during all stages of the
pregnancy.
In the fall of 1961, shortly after the Poe decision, Alexander M.
Bickel, a Yale professor, put forth an elaborate, sophisticated thesis
in support of Supreme Court avoidance of constitutional adjudi-
cation on the merits.9 The next year this thesis became the basis
of a book entitled: The Least Dangerous Branch, the Supreme
Court at the Bar of Politics.10 The purpose of this article is to ana-
lyze the activity of the Supreme Court in the developing area of
privacy in matters of procreation from the Poe decision to the Roe
decision in terms of the thesis presented by Bickel in these works.
Specifically, this article will examine Bickel's thesis in detail and
the timing and rationale of the Roe decision from this Bickelian
viewpoint.
5. 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
6. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1967). The statute in pertinent part pro-
vides:
Whoever ... produce[s] an abortion. . . on any woman,
unless the same were done as necessary for the preservation
of the mother's life or health and under the direction of a
competent licensed practitioner of medicine, shall be impris-
oned ....
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. TEX. PENAL CODE art. 1196 (1961).
9. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive Vir-
tues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
10. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS (1962) [hereinafter cited as BICKEL].
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II. BICKELIAN THESIS
In order to understand Bickel's thesis, it is essential to define
exactly what he is attempting to justify. This is a difficult task
since Bickel's discussion is often on several levels and the same
statement often has meaning on several different levels. As one
commentator, in reviewing his book, said, "I did not find this book
easy reading."'" Thus forewarned, as a general matter, Bickel
attempts to justify and define the role of the Supreme Court in
the American polity and governmental scheme. Initially, he at-
tempts to defend the Court's exercise of the power of judicial re-
view. Bickel feels that this power must be defended for several
reasons. He acknowledges that the power of judicial review can-
not be found in the Constitution, although this is not to say
that it cannot be placed there.' 2 He also realizes that when the
Court invalidates a statute passed by an elected, representative body,
its action is potentially "anti-majoritarian" or "democratically de-
viant." This results since the Court is thwarting the theoretical
voice and will of the majority speaking through its elected repre-
sentatives who are directly responsible to the public.'
3
Unable to accept the traditional basis for judicial review set forth
by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison,14 since the proofs
at the same time "are not only frail, they are too strong; they prove
too much ' 15 and unable to answer fully all the arguments against
judicial review, Bickel resorts to a truism to justify the device.
The truism is that "many actions of government have two aspects:
their immediate, necessarily intended, practical effects, and their
perhaps unintended or unappreciated bearing on values we hold to
have more general and permanent interest."'16 The question then
arises who is to be the guardian of such values. Although legis-
latures and executives are directly elected and responsible to the
majority, in reality most legislation is passed by pluralist groups or
temporary majorities. This factor which makes them responsive to
immediate needs is the very reason that they are not so well-fitted
as the Supreme Court to be the guardian of the principles embodied
in the Constitution.
17
11. Klonoski, Book Review, 42 Oas. L. REv. 83 (1962).
12. BIcEL, supra note 10, at 1.
13. Id. at 16-18.
14. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
15. BIcFEL, supra note 10, at 2. See also BIcKEL, supra note 10, at 2-14.
16. Id. at 24.
17. BicKEL, supra note 10, at 27. Bickel sets forth several reasons why
the Court is better suited to perform this task. The Court is isolated
from the direct political pressures to which the legislatures are sub-
ject. Also the justices should have the leisure, the training and the
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As guardians then of the country's long-range goals, the Court
should only invalidate legislative actions when it has a principled
basis for so doing. Consequently, Bickel would agree with Herbert
Wechsler' 8 to the extent that judicial review is the principled proc-
ess of enunciating and applying certain enduring values to our
society. Bickel would also agree with Marshall that a statute's
repugnancy to the Constitution in most cases is not self-evident,
but is rather an issue of policy that someone must decide.19 There-
fore a decision of invalidity is a value judgment that must be placed
on a principled, long-range view of where society should be headed
and on enduring values in society.
However, Bickel realizes, along with Professor Charles L. Black,2 0
that the Court performs not only a checking function but also a le-
gitimating one. That is, the Court in the exercise of judicial review
not only invalidates legislation but also approves, or at least does
not disapprove, statutes and thus adds its moral approval to the
course of the legislative policy. This is a very important function
to Bickel, since he feels that the Court holds a position of esteem in
the country and that it serves a mystic function giving its imprima-
tur to legislative enactments. Indeed, "[t]he Court's high 'degree
of credit' is a fact of life."''1
Consequently, Bickel feels that "[t]he constitutional function of
isolation to make scholarly studies into the ends of government. In
addition, by the time a case regarding certain legislation gets before
the Court, it is able to view the legislation in concrete situations
whereas the legislature was able to view the problem only in the
abstract and therefore is able to give a sober second thought to the
legislation. Finally, the Court is viewed as a continuum with some
measure of stability and thus the public is better able to see the
Court in this role of guardian. Id. at 24-26, 31.
18. Herbert Wechsler, a professor of law at Columbia, in attempting to
justify the exercise of judicial review, argues that the decisions in
constitutional cases must rest on "neutral principles" which would
apply to all similar situations and not merely to the case before the
Court. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARv. L. Rsv. 1 (1959). In that article Wechsler states:
I put it to you that the main constituent of the judicial
process is that it must be genuinely principled, resting with
respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment
on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate re-
sult that is achieved.
Id. at 15. See also BicKEL, supra note 10, at 49-65. For a definition
of a "neutral principle," see note 23 infra.
19. BICKEL, supra note 10, at 3.
20. Charles L. Black, a professor of law at Yale, advanced his theory of
judicial review in C. BLAcK, THE PEOPLE AND THE CounRT (1960). See
also BiCmmr, supra note 10, at 29.
21. BiCKEL, supra note 10, at 130.
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the Court is to define values and proclaim principles,112 2 whenever
it makes a constitutional adjudication. However, a major problem
arises since this function cannot be exercised with respect to rela-
tively few matters while society is left to drift with respect to its
other concerns. In addition, in some matters, such as integration,
society requires both principle and expediency at the same time.
Bickel therefore rejects Wechsler's idea of neutral principles23 as
a basis for every decision which the Court makes, since "it would
require the Court to validate with overtones of principle most of
what the political institutions do merely on grounds of expediency.24
Bickel feels that some input (not necessarily a decision) is needed
from the Court to aid the political branches in making expedient
decisions before a principled decision with enduring effects is made
by the Court.
At the core of Bickel's thesis is the fact that the Court is not
always faced with the choice of invalidation or legitimization.
Bickel says:
The essentially important fact, so often missed, is that the Court
wields a threefold power. It may strike down legislation as in-
consistent with principle. It may validate, or, in Charles L. Black's
better word, "legitimate" legislation as consistent with principle.
Or it may do neither. It may do neither, and therein lies the
secret of its ability to maintain itself in the tension between
principle and expediency.25
Bickel feels that when the Court exercises the first two of these
triune functions, it must do so on a principled basis. However,
as for the exercise of the third power, Bickel notes that:
When the Court, however, stays its hand, and makes clear
that it is staying its hand and not legitimating, then the political
processes are given relatively free play. Such a decision needs
relatively little justification in terms of consistency with democratic
theory. It needs more to be justified as compatible with the Court's
role as defender of the faith, proclaimer and protector of the goals.
But in withholding constitutional judgment, the Court does not
necessarily forsake an educational function, nor does it abandon
principle. It seeks merely to elicit the correct answers to certain
prudential questions that, in such a society as Lincoln conceived,
lie in the path of ultimate issues of principle. To this end, the
Court has, over the years, developed an almost inexhaustible
arsenal of techniques and devices. Most of them are quite properly
22. Id. at 68.
23. As interpreted by Bickel, a neutral principle is "an intellectually
coherent statement of the reason for a result which in like cases will
produce a like result, whether or not it is immediately agreeable or
expedient." Id. at 59.
24. Id. at 69.
25. Id. (original emphasis).
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called techniques for eliciting answers, since so often they engage
the Court in a Socratic colloquy with the other institutions of gov-
ernment and with society as a whole concerning the necessity for
this or that measure, for this or that compromise. All the while,
the issue of principle remains in abeyance and ripens. "The most
important thing we do," said Brandeis, "is not doing." He had in
mind all the techniques, of which he was a past master, for staying
the Court's hand. They are the most important thing, because
they make possible performance of the Court's grand function as
proclaimer and protector of the goals. These are the techniques
that allow leeway to expediency without abandoning principle.
Therefore they make possible a principled government. 26
As an example of this theory, Bickel discusses what he refers to
as Plessy v. Ferguson's Error,27 which was not that the Court re-
fused to invalidate segregation but rather that the Court legiti-
mated it. Bickel feels that if the question as to the constitutionality
of segregation had been left undecided many of the problems pres-
ent in the country and presented to the Court in Brown v. Board of
Education28 would not have appeared.
Another reason why the Supreme Court should stay its hand
rather than make a constitutional adjudication at every oppor-
tunity is the prudential concerns with which the Court must
contend. Although the Court is held in high esteem, it does not
have any authority of its own to enforce its decisions. Having
"neither force nor will,"29 the effectiveness of the Court depends
upon its continuing to be held in high esteem and the ability of its
decisions to garner widespread acceptance. The Court cannot an-
nounce a principle, however true it may be, if the public will not
accept it. This is but another facet of the fact that judicial review
is democratically deviant.
Another quotation from his book helps to explain Bickel's thesis:
The Court is a leader of opinion, not a mere register of it, but it
must lead opinion, not merely impose its own; and-the short of
it is-it labors under the obligation to succeed.
In one sense, we have thus got no nearer to parsing the inex-
pressible. "These judges," Mr. Justice Frankfurter was reduced to
26. Id. at 70-71.
27. Id. at 197. This, of course is named after the famous case of Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), in which the Supreme Court held
the doctrine of "separate but equal" to be constitutional.
28. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29. This phrase is taken from the 78th Federalist Paper written by Alex-
ander Hamilton entitled "The Judges as Guardians of the Constitu-
tion," in which Hamilton states:
The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over ei-
ther the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength
or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active reso-
lution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither
FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment ....
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telling the American Philosophical Society in 1954, ". . must have
something of the creative artist in them; they must have antennae
registering feelings and judgment beyond logical, let alone quanti-
tative, proof." But in another sense, the matter is far advanced
once it is seen that the Court must pronounce only those principles
which can gain "widespread acceptance," that it is at once shaper
and prophet of the opinion that will prevail and endure. To be
sure, there is still not much help in "quantitative proof"; it is still
a question of "antennae." But we can be much clearer concerning
ways to go about the task, to limit its challenge and make it
manageable. The first wisdom, as I have tried to show, is that
the moment of ultimate judgment need not come either suddenly
or haphazardly. Its timing and circumstances can be controlled.
On the way to it, both the Court and the country travel the paths
of the many lesser doctrines, passive and constitutional, that I have
sought to describe and assess. Over time, as a problem is lived
with, the Court does not work in isolation to divine the answer
that is right. It has the means to elicit partial answers and
reactions from the other institutions, and to try tentative answers
itself. When at last the Court decides that "judgment cannot be
escaped-the judgment of this Court," the answer is likely to be
a proposition "to which widespread acceptance may fairly be
attributed," because in the course of a continuing colloquy with
the political institutions and with society at large, the Court has
shaped and reduced the question, and perhaps because it has
rendered the answer familiar if not obvious. In these continuing
colloquies, the profession-the practicing and teaching profession
of the law-plays a major role; the law, as Bentham long ago
remarked, is made, not by judge alone, but by judge and company.
But in American society the colloquy goes well beyond the pro-
fession and reaches deeply into the places where public opinion is
formed.
I do not wish to maintain that this process is as deliberate,
as well understood, or as well managed-by the judges, by the
profession or by the public-as it might be. The modest effort of
this book is to contribute to better understanding of it and to
greater deliberation in its management. But my thesis is that such
is in fact the process of judicial review carried on by the American
Supreme Court.30
In order for the Court to carry on this colloquy with the polit-
ical institutions and society at large, avoid constitutional adjudi-
cations and relieve the tension between expediency and principle,
it has developed a number of "mediating techniques" of "not
doing" based on technical legal concepts. Bickel christens these
techniques the "passive virtues"-"passive" because no determina-
tion is made on a constitutional or principled basis and "virtues" be-
cause they have the advantage of advancing the colloquy. Several
of the passive virtues discussed by Bickel in the context of specific
cases include: case or controversy requirements; standing; justici-
30. BIcKEL, supra note 10, at 239-40 (footnotes omitted).
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ability; ripeness; political question; vagueness; desuetude; and
mootness.31
To briefly summarize, Bickel sets out to define the role of the
Supreme Court in the American polity and puts forth a call for a
principled government with principled decisions designed to have
enduring and lasting effects. Judicial review is to be justified only
if it adds something to the process, which is principle. In addition,
since there are demands on the system requiring immedate atten-
tion and the principled decisions of the Supreme Court need to gain
widespread acceptance, the Court must be able to have some input
into the system without making each decision a constitutional ad-
judication. As a result, the Court uses what Bickel calls the passive
virtues to balance these complex problems. This, all too shortly,
is the heart of Bickel's thesis. Whether it is a valid thesis, whether
it works and what are its effects will now be examined in the light
of the abortion controversy and the landmark case of Roe v. Wade.32
III. SUPREME COURT AND PRIVACY IN PROCREATION
There are very few things about the decision in Roe v. Wade 3
on which everyone in America can or would agree. On the first
page of its opinion, the Court observed:
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and
emotional nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous op-
posing views, even among physicians, and of the deep and seem-
ingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One's philos-
ophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges of human
existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes toward life and
family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes
and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's
thinking and conclusions about abortion.
Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional
measurement free of emotion and of predilection.3 4
Clearly the Court was faced with a value judgment and Bickel
would argue that this judgment would have to be placed on a prin-
ciple that had been shaped and reduced through a colloquy with
the political institutions and society at large. The Court in Roe
held that the right of privacy included the decision to have an abor-
tion, however, this right had to be balanced against the state's in-
terest in protecting the health of the mother and the potential life
of the fetus. As a result the Court divided the period of preg-
nancy into trimesters and held:
31. Id. at 111-98.
32. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 116.
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(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to
the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physi-
cian.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the
first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of
the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in
ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability the State, in pro-
moting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it
chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation
of the life or health of the mother.3 5
An analysis of some developments in society and the case law which
preceded Roe is necessary to determine whether the colloquy
which Bickel envisions was effective, whether the controversy had
been properly ripened, whether the decision in Roe was met with
widespread acceptance and whether the principle announced is one
that will prevail and endure.
The classic example that Bickel uses to describe his theory of
avoidance of constitutional adjudications is Poe v. Ullman.38 Poe
was a consolidation of declaratory judgment actions brought by a
Connecticut couple, a housewife and a Dr. Buxton to test the valid-
ity of a Connecticut statute37 which forbade the dissemination of
contraceptives and contraceptive information to everyone, including
married couples. The statute in question had been passed in 1879
and except for two police court violations for vending machine
sales and a prosecution in 1940 against two doctors and a nurse for
aiding and abetting violation of the statute in the operation of a
birth-control clinic, there were no recorded instances of prosecu-
tion.88 The plaintiffs alleged the statute violated the fourteenth
amendment by depriving them of life and property without due
process of law. The complaints alleged that two of the plaintiffs
who were married women needed medical devices for the protec-
tion of their health but that Dr. Buxton was deterred from giving
such advice because the state attorney intended to prosecute any
offense against the statute.
According to Bickel, there were two choices open to the
Court: 1. it could have decided the controversy on the merits, how-
ever, this would have allowed the state's political institutions to
evade their own responsibility to either enforce the statute or re-
35. Id. at 164-65.
36. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
37. CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv., § 53-32 (1958). See note 2 supra.
38. BIcxEL, supra note 10, at 145-46.
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peal it; or 2. it could, by judicial abstention, set in motion the proc-
ess of political decision. The court in Poe refused to reach the mer-
its of the case. Speaking through Justice Frankfurter, a four-man
plurality felt that in the light of the history of nonenforcement,
there was no immediacy of prosecution, which is an indispensable
condition of constitutional adjudication. Justice Frankfurter said,
"This Court cannot be umpire to debates concerning harmless,
empty statutes. To find it necessary to pass on these statutes now,
in order to protect appellants from the hazards of prosecution would
be to close our eyes to reality."3 9 The Court also noted that "the
undeviating policy of nullification by Connecticut of its anti-contra-
ceptive laws throughout all the long years that they have been on
the statute books bespeaks more than prosecutorial paralysis. '40
To Bickel this "undeviating policy of nullification" reflected the
political deadlock in Connecticut and the political institutions had
the responsibility to break this deadlock by making an initial
decision. It is this decision which should be reviewed by the Su-
preme Court. Referring to the anti-majoritarian difficulty, Bickel
notes, "[I]t is quite wrong for the Court to relieve them of this
burden of self-government. However much judicial review may
always-but uncertainly, inconclusively, and unavoidably-'dwarf
the political capacity of the people,' it should surely not do so know-
ingly, demonstrably, avoidably."'4 1 Thus, Bickel applauds the re-
sult in Poe.
However, there were four dissenters to the abstention.42  Both
Justices Douglas43 and Harlan, 44 foreshadowing the result in Gris-
wold, expressed the opinion that the statute was an unconstitu-
tional infringement on the appellants' rights. 45  In a concurring
opinion, Justice Brennan noted,
The true controversy in this case is over the opening of birth-
control clinics on a large scale; it is that which the State has pre-
39. 367 U.S. at 508.
40. Id. at 502.
41. BICKEL, supra note 10, at 156.
42. The dissenters were Justices Black, Stewart, Douglas and Harlan.
43. 367 U.S. at 509-22.
44. Id. at 522-55.
45. In a separate dissent, Justice Stewart stated:
Since the appeals are nonetheless dismissed, my dissent
need go no further. However, in refraining from a discus-
sion of the constitutional issues, I in no way imply that the
ultimate result I would reach on the merits of these contro-
versies would differ from the conclusions of my dissenting
Brothers.
Id. at 555. The dissent of Justice Black merely states that he believed
that the constitutional questions should be reached and decided. Id.
at 509.
FROM POE TO ROE
vented in the past, not the use of contraceptives by isolated and
individual married couples. It will be time enough to decide the
constitutional questions urged upon us when, if ever, that real
controversy flares up again.4 6
It did not take long for the controversy to flare up again and in
1965 Dr. Buxton was once again before the Supreme Court with a
Mrs. Griswold, the director of a birth-control clinic, urging that the
Connecticut statutes were unconstitutional.4 7 However, this time
the challenge was raised as a defense to a prosecution under the
statutes. Unable in June of 1961 to achieve a decision on the merits
in Poe, the appellants opened a birth-control clinic and operated it
from November 1, 1961, to November 10, 1961, when it was closed
by the state. On this appeal the Supreme Court reached the merits
of the controversy, which it had avoided four years earlier, and
held that the appellants had standing to raise the constitutional
rights of their patients. Although they were unable to agree on
the constitutional source of the right, seven justices found there
was a right of privacy in the Constitution and that the Connecticut
statutes were an infringement of this right.
Bickel had urged that the Court abstain from the merits until
the political institutions had made the initial decision. However,
in this instance the initial decision was made by the appellants in
opening the clinics and the political agencies had responded by pros-
ecutions. This does not necessarily mean that the colloquy had
failed. Writing about the decision, one commentator noted:
The decision in Griswold v. Connecticut answered one question,
but perhaps only one. The Court held that the Connecticut stat-
ute forbidding the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally invaded
the right of marital privacy. By 1965 the ruling on that narrow
question was almost anticlimatic. Twice before, in 1943 and 1961,
the same issue had been presented to the Court, but both cases
had been dismissed for lack of standing or ripeness. When the
Court finally decided the substantive issue, few remained to de-
fend the statute. The Roman Catholic Church, for instance, which
presumably had supported the retention of the Connecticut ban on
the use of contraceptives, seemed reconciled to the invalidation of
the statute in Griswold.4s
Later in that same article, the author said:
It is well known that the Catholic Church has long objected
on moral grounds to the use of contraceptives. Indeed, in days
past Catholic authorities in Massachusetts supported 'Vote God's
Way' campaigns against repeal of the state's laws prohibiting the
dissemination of birth control information. ...
46. Id. at 509.
47. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
48. McKay, The Right of Privacy: Emanations and Intimations, 64 MIcH.
L. REv. 259, 261 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
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Gradually, however, Catholic support of these statutes weak-
ened, although without any change in the moral prohibition ap-
plicable to members of that church. Indeed, the Catholic Confer-
ence on Civil Liberties presented an amicus curiae brief in Gris-
wold supporting invalidation, on privacy grounds, of the Connect-
icut law.49
Thus, there is some support for the idea that by delaying the de-
cision regarding the birth-control statutes, the Supreme Court was
able to "buy some time" and gain widespread acceptance for the
result in Griswold.
The fact that there was general satisfaction with the result,
however, does not mean there was general agreement as to the
soundness of the constitutional basis for the decision. Nor does it
mean that those who applauded the result were in agreement as to
the holding's future significance. In addition, there was no real
colloquy as to the principle announced (except through the dis-
sents of Harlan and Douglas in Poe) although the general pro-
nouncement as to a right of privacy was probably widely accepted.
In 1969 the right of privacy announced in Griswold was expand-
ed to include the right of a woman to choose to have an abortion.
In People v. Belous,50 the California Supreme Court reversed the
conviction of a Dr. Belous for committing an abortion and conspir-
ing to commit an abortion under the old California abortion stat-
ute.5 1 This was the first case which had extended the Griswold
rationale and overturned a state abortion statute. The court seem-
ingly did not have any trouble in extending the Griswold privacy
concept. In fact the court said, "The critical issue is not whether
such rights exist, but whether the state has a compelling interest in
the regulation of a subject which is within the police powers of the
state. '52 However, in ruling the statute unconstitutional, the court
did not place its emphasis on the right of privacy but on other
grounds. Basically, the court found that the statutory exception
49. Id. at 280.
50. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
51. The statute under which the doctor had been indicted provided:
Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to
any woman, or procures any woman to take any medicine,
drug, or substance, or uses or employs any instrument or other
means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the mis-
carriage of such woman, unless the same is necessary to pre-
serve her life, is punishable by imprisonment in the State pri-
son not less than two nor more than five years.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West 1955). The defendant had not actually
performed an abortion, but had merely referred the woman to an
unlicensed doctor who performed the abortion. In addition, the stat-
ute had been amended and liberalized after the abortion, but prior
to the appeal. See note 57 infra.
52. 71 Cal. 2d at 964, 458 P.2d at 200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
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to abortion, "unless the same is necessary to preserve her life,"' 5
was not susceptible of a construction that did not violate legis-
lative intent and at the same time be sufficiently certain to satisfy
due process without improperly infringing on fundamental consti-
tutional rights. The court felt that the vagueness was compounded
since the decision whether an abortion fell within the statutory ex-
ception was delegated to the doctor who was to act at his peril, if
his determination was contradicted by a jury. The court said, "The
delegation of a decision making power to a directly involved indi-
vidual violates the Fourteenth Amendment.""5
In attempting to find a state interest to support the statute, the
court referred to the medical protection afforded to the mother and
the protection of the fetus. With respect to the former, the court
noted that the statute was originally passed as a health measure
but it was now medically safer to have an abortion in the first
three months of the pregnancy than to carry the child to term. As
for the latter, the court noted that all the rights accorded to a fetus
depended either on live birth or reflected the interests of the par-
ents.55 Thus, the fetus itself was discounted as a person entitled
to protection. The court also pointed out the number of illegal abor-
tions being performed, mostly by unqualified persons, and the major
health problems created thereby. Appeal was attempted to the
Supreme Court; however, certiorari was denied.56 Although the
area of conflict was set out and basic battle-lines were drawn, the
Supreme Court refused to become involved.
It is important to note that at the time of the Belous decision the
California abortion statute under which the defendant was charged
had been amended and liberalized.57 The people of California,
53. CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West 1955). See note 51 supra.
54. 71 Cal. 2d at 972-73, 458 P.2d at 206, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
55. Id. at 968, 458 P.2d at 202, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
56. 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
57. CAL. PNvAL CODE § 274 (West 1970), provides:
Every person who provides, supplies or administers to any
woman, or procures any woman to take any medicine, drug or
substance, or uses or employs any instrument or other means
whatever, with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of
such woman, except as provided in the Therapeutic Abortion
Act ... of the Health and Safety Code, is punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison not less than two nor more
than five years.
The Therapeutic Abortion Act (HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25950-954)
authorizes abortions "only" if the abortion takes place in an accred-
ited hospital (§ 25951(a)); the abortion is approved by a hospital
staff committee consisting of at least three licensed physicians and
surgeons § 25951(b)); and there is "substantial risk that continu-
ance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental
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speaking through their legislature, had decided that the former stat-
utory scheme was too strict. Of even more importance is the fact
that the statutory liberalization in California was not an isolated
event. In 1962 the American Law Institute study on criminal law
reform set forth proposals for abortion reform to be included in
the Model Penal Code.58 From the time of these proposals to the
health of the mother" (§ 25951(c) (1)); the pregnancy resulted from
rape or incest (§ 25951 (c) (2)); or the woman is under 15 years of
age (§ 25952(c)).
58. The MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (1962) provides:
(1) Unjustified Abortion. A person who purposely and
unjustifiably terminates the pregnancy of another otherwise
than by a live birth commits a felony of the third degree or,
where the pregnancy has continued beyond the twenty-sixth
week, a felony of the second degree.
(2) Justifiable Abortion. A licensed physician is justi-
fied in terminating a pregnancy if he believes there is sub-
stantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely
impair the physical or mental health of the mother or that
the child would be born with grave physical or mental de-
fect, or that the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or
other felonious intercourse. All illicit intercourse with a girl
below the age of 16 shall be deemed felonious for purposes
of this subsection. Justifiable abortions shall be performed
only in a licensed hospital except in case of emergency when
hospital facilities are unavailable. [Additional exceptions
from the requirement of hospitalization may be incorporated
here to take account of situations in sparsely settled areas
where hospitals are not generally accessible.]
(3) Physicians' Certificates; Presumption from Non-Com-
pliance. No abortion shall be performed unless two physi-
cians, one of whom may be the person performing the abor-
tion, shall have certified in writing the circumstances which
they believe to justify the abortion. Such certificate shall
be submitted before the abortion to the hospital where it is
to be performed and, in the case of abortion following felo-
nious intercourse, to the prosecuting attorney or the police.
Failure to comply with any of the requirements of this Sub-
section gives rise to a presumption that the abortion was
unjustified.
(4) Self-Abortion. A woman whose pregnancy has con-
tinued beyond the twenty-sixth week commits a felony of
the third degree if she purposely terminates her own preg-
nancy otherwise than by a live birth, or if she uses instru-
ments, drugs or violence upon herself for that purpose. Ex-
cept as justified under Subsection (2), a person who induces
or knowingly aids a woman to use instruments, drugs or vio-
lence upon herself for the purpose of terminating her preg-
nancy otherwise than by a live birth commits a felony of the
third degree whether or not the pregnancy has continued be-
yond the twenty-sixth week.(5) Pretended Abortion. A person commits a felony of
the third degree if, representing that it is his purpose to per-
form an abortion, he does an act adapted to cause abortion in
a pregnant woman although the woman is in fact not preg-
nant, or the actor does not believe she is. A person charged
with unjustified abortion under Subsection (1) or an attempt
to commit that offense may be convicted thereof upon proof
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decision in Roe, fourteen states rewrote their statutes to conform
basically to the A.L.I. proposals. 59 In addition, four other states
passed even more liberalized statutes.09
The decision in Belous heralded the start of a number of suits
in which the constitutionality of abortion statutes throughout the
country were attacked.61 A number of these challenges to restric-
tive abortion statutes were brought by doctors seeking declara-
tory judgments 2 and injunctive relief0 3 against enforcement of
of conduct prohibited by this Subsection.
(6) Distribution of Aborfifacienis. A person who sells,
offers to sell, possesses with intent to sell, advertises, or dis-
plays for sale anything specially designed to terminate a
pregnancy, or held out by the actor as useful for that pur-
pose, commits a misdemeanor, unless:
(a) the sale, offer or display is to a physician or
druggist or to an intermediary in a chain of distribution
to physicians or druggists; or
(b) the sale is made upon prescription or order of
a physician; or
(c) the possession is with intent to sell as authorized
in paragraphs (a) and (b); or
(d) the advertising is addressed to persons named
in paragraph (a) and confined to trade or professional
channels not likely to reach the general public.(7) Section Inapplicable to Prevention of Pregnancy.
Nothing in this Section shall be deemed applicable to the
prescription, administration or distribution of drugs or other
substances for avoiding pregnancy, whether by preventing
implantation of a fertilized ovum or by any other method
that operates before, at or immediately after fertilization.
59. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-303 to -310 (Supp. 1971); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE §§ 25950-955.5 (West Supp. 1973); CoLo. Rzv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40-2-50 to -53 (Supp. 1967); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 1790-
93 (Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.22 (Supp. 1972); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 26-1201 to -1203 (1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407 (Supp.
1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §§ 137-39 (Repl. 1971); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 2223 (Supp. 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A-5-1 to -5-3 (Repl.
1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1971); Opr. Rzv. STAT. §§
435.405-.495 (1971); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-82 to -89 (Supp. 1971); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-62 to -62.3 (Supp. 1973).
60. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.060 (1970); HAwAEI REv. LAWS § 453-16
(Supp. 1972); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 125.05 (McKinney Supp. 1973);
WASH. REv. CODE §§ 9.02.060-.080 (Supp. 1972).
61. See notes 64 and 65 infra.
62. Declaratory judgments are brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970)
which provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, ex-
cept with respect to Federal taxes, any court of the United
States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may de-
clare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief
is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be
reviewable as such.
63. Actions for injunctive relief are brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2281
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abortion statutes by state officials. Also other challenges arose
in state courts as defenses to prosecutions. The legal arguments
in these cases centered on the two basic arguments made in Belous;
i.e., vagueness and the interest of the state in protecting the fetus.
A detailed analysis of each of these cases will not be attempted
here, but it is important to note that the courts were split
almost evenly on the issue; some held the statute invalid, at least
in part, because of vagueness or overbreadth in the infringement
of rights,64 others upheld the state statutes.65 The diversity of
opinion can be easily demonstrated by a brief examination of some
of these cases. In Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Ex-
aminers66 and in State v. Munson,67 each of the courts in uphold-
ing the statute held that the legislature was the proper body to de-
termine the status and rights of a fetus and its determination was
(1970) which provides:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the
enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by
restraining the action of any officer of such State in the en-
forcement or execution of such statute or of an order made
by an administrative board or commission acting under State
statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or judge
thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such
statute unless the application therefor is heard and deter-
mined by a district court of three judges under section 2284
of this title.
64. See, e.g., Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated,
411 U.S. 940 (1973); Y.W.C.A. v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J.
1972); Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986 (D. Kan. 1972); Doe v.
Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Il1. 1971); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp.
1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970), modified and affd, 411 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v.
Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970), modified and affd, 411
U.S. 113 (1973); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.
1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1 (1970); United States v. Vuitch,
305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 402 U.S. 62 (1971); People v.
Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970); State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431 (Fla.
1972).
65. See, e.g., Crossen v. Attorney General, 344 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. Ky.
1972), rev'd sub nom., Crossen v. Breckenride, 446 F.2d 833 (6th
Cir.), vacated, 410 U.S. 950 (1973); Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp.
1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 950 (1973);
Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Rosen v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D.
La. 1970), vacated and remanded, 412 U.S. 902 (1973); Cheaney v.
Indiana, - Ind. -, 285 N.E.2d 265 (1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1516
(1973); Spears v. State, 257 So. 2d 876 (Miss. 1972); State v. Munson,
- S.D. -, 201 N.W.2d 123 (1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S.
950 (1973).
66. 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970), vacated and remanded, 412 U.S.
902 (1973).
67. - S.D. -, 201 N.W.2d 123 (1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S.
950 (1973).
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not to be overturned in the absence of compelling reasons; in Stein-
berg v. Brown, s the court held that the legislature had an affirm-
ative duty under the fourteenth amendment to protect the fetus;
in United States v. Vuitch,6 9 the district court held that the District
of Columbia abortion statute was unconstitutionally vague but that
the Congress could require that all abortions be performed by quali-
fied doctors; and in Doe v. Scott,70 the court divided the period of
pregnancy into trimesters assigning various rights to the woman
and the state depending on the stage of the pregnancy.
An overwhelming number of these decisions were appealed to
the Supreme Court by various means; however, with one exception
the Supreme Court refused to hear any of these cases on the merits.
It was obvious that the Court was staying its hand and allowing
a colloquy to develop among the lower courts, legislatures and so-
ciety in general. In addition to the case law and legislative activity,
society in general was undergoing significant change. The phenom-
enon of women's liberation, including a proposed Equal Rights
Amendment to the Constitution, was beginning to become a force
in society. A new role in society for women in general was taking
shape and one of the main goals of the movement was to liberalize
abortion laws. The pros and cons of abortion were widely and
openly discussed, the issues were being narrowed and the arguments
were being made familiar. The one abortion case which the Court
heard on the merits prior to the Roe case was United States v.
Vuitch.71 Why and how the Court chose this case as a vehicle to join
in the colloquy presents an interesting look at Bickel's thesis.
Dr. Milan Vuitch was indicted for violation of the District of
Columbia abortion statute which prohibited abortions "unless the
same were done as necessary for the preservation of the mother's
life or health."72 Prior to trial, he moved to dismiss the indictments
on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional. The United
States District Court for the District of Columbia agreed and dis-
missed the indictments against him3. The court felt that earlier
68. 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
69. 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
70. 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
71. 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
72. D.C. CODE AN. § 22-201 (1967). See note 6 supra.
73. 305 F. Supp. at 1036. The district court, however, refused to dismiss
an indictment against a nurse's aid who also was indicted under the
statute for an unrelated offense. Id. The court felt that the statu-
tory requirement that any abortion be performed "under the direc-
tion of a competent licensed practitioner of medicine" was severable
from the preservation-of-life-or-health standard and while the latter
was unconstitutionally vague, the former represented a proper, sep-
arate legislative purpose. The court noted that the two-pronged
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case law in the District of Columbia had established that once the
prosecution had proven that a doctor had committed an abortion, the
burden shifted to the doctor to justify his action.7 4 In short, the
doctor was presumed guilty unless he could prove his act fit within
the statutory exception. The court felt that the doctor's profes-
sional, good faith judgment should not be subject to challenge and
held that the statute was unconstitutionally vague for failing to
give the certainty required by due process.7 5  The ambiguities
of the statute were particularly suspect since the statute greatly
infringed on a significant constitutional right of an individual. In
dismissing the indictments, the judge noted that a prompt appeal
to the Supreme Court under section 3731 of Title 18 of the United
States Code,76 as then enacted, was highly desirable.7 7 The govern-
ment did appeal and on April 12, 1971, almost a year and a half after
the district court decision, the Supreme Court reversed the lower
court.7 8 The Supreme Court held that the burden was on the pros-
ecution to plead and prove the defendant's act was not within
the statutory exception, 9 that the word "health" included mental
as well as physical health,80 that the statute was not vague and the
delegation to doctors to determine the meaning of "health" was not
improper since that type of judgment had to be made every day
by doctors whenever surgery was required.81
exception clearly showed Congressional concern with the medical fac-
tors involved in abortions. Id. at 1035.
74. Id. at 1034. The cases the court relied on were Peckham v. United
States, 226 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1955), and Williams v. United States,
138 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
75. 305 F. Supp. at 1034.
76. At that time, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 provided in pertinent part:
An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United
States from the district courts direct to the Supreme Court
of the United States in all criminal cases in the following
instances:
From a decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing
any indictment or information, or any count thereof, where
such decision or judgment is based upon the invalidity or
construction of the statute upon which the indictment or
information is founded.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 844, as amended Act of May
24, 1949, ch. 139, § 58, 63 Stat. 97.
77. 305 F. Supp. at 1036.
78. 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
79. Id. at 69-70.
80. Id. at 71-72.
81. Id. at 72. Compare People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80
Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), where the court held that the delegation to the
doctor to ascertain if the case fit within the statutory exception was
a violation of the fourteenth amendment. See note 54 and accom-
panying text supra.
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Several aspects of the Vuitch decision deserve special attention.
First, there was a serious question whether the Supreme Court
had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 82 Second, the appeal on the
merits was specifically limited to the question of vagueness.8 3
Third, the decision itself which upheld the statute. An analysis
of the interaction of these three elements provides a fascinating
study of the Bickelian thesis in operation.
As will be recalled, the lower court dismissed the indictments
against the defendant and at the same time advised taldng a direct
appeal to the Supreme Court by means of section 3731 of Title 18
of the United States Code.8 4 Subsequent to the filing of the appeal
but prior to the decision, the statute was amended and direct ap-
peals to the Supreme Court were eliminated.8 5 Of direct interest
in Vuitch was whether this statute prior to amendment allowed
appeals from the District of Columbia. Five of the justices read
the old statute broadly and held that "statutes" and laws passed
by Congress included laws passed solely for the District of Columbia
and consequently the Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
Four justices dissented and felt that the statute was not applicable
and the proper procedure was to appeal to the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia under another statute.8 6 Thus, the
criminal appeals statute was given a slightly expansive reading, or
at least not the narrowest one possible, in order to hear this particu-
82. A decision whether jurisdiction existed was postponed until a hearing
on the merits. United States v. Vuitch, 397 U.S. 1061 (1970). Later
in an order on June 29, 1970, the Court requested the parties to brief
and argue the following questions:
1. Does this Court have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731
to entertain a direct appeal from a decision of the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissing
an indictment on the ground of the invalidity of the statute
on which the indictment is founded, where the statute, al-
though an act of Congress, applies only in the District of
Columbia?
2. Could the District Court's decision in this case have
been appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-105?
3. If the decision could have been appealed to the District
of Columbia Circuit, should this Court, as a matter of soundjudicial administration, abstain from accepting jurisdiction
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731 because the case involves the
validity of a statute the application of which is confined to
the District of Columbia?
United States v. Vuitch, 399 U.S. 923 (1970).
83. 402 U.S. at 73.
84. See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
85. Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 § 14(a), 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970).
86. D.C. CoDE ANN. § 23-105 (1967). The dissenters with respect to thejurisdictional question were Justices Harlan, Brennan, Marshall and
Blackmun.
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lar appeal, when it would have been very easy for the Court to exer-
cise one of its passive virtues and avoid any adjudication on the
merits.
At one level, Bickel would disapprove of the Court's assumption
of jurisdiction, since these technicalities, such as the interpreta-
tion of this statute, are the devices to avoid constitutional adjudi-
cations rather than unnecessarily assume jurisdiction to decide
controversial issues. Nevertheless, this assumption of jurisdiction
must be viewed in the light of the other aspects of the case. There
was really no chance of a long-range expansion of jurisdiction since
the statute had already been amended. More importantly, since
the indictment had been dismissed solely on the basis of vague-
ness, the Court could reach the merits of the abortion controversy
without reaching a discussion of the right of privacy. Also the Dis-
trict of Columbia statute was one of only two restrictive abortion
statutes with the word "health," so even if the statute were held to
be unconstitutionally vague only two statutes would be affected.8"
The net result was that with the appeal limited to vagueness, the
Court could join the colloquy on a limited basis.
But a question arises whether it was necessary for the Court to
hear the case at all. Other than taking away one barrel of the two
barrelled attack on abortion legislation, did this decision add any-
thing to the colloquy? The decision upheld the validity of the
statute but placed a heavy burden on the state to prove the abor-
tion was not within the exception, placed a heavy presumption on
the side of the doctor, and appeared to make a successful prosecu-
tion very difficult. On the other hand, doctors acting in good faith
could be subject to the ordeal and expense of a prosecution. As
Justice Douglas noted in dissent, since the abortion question was
a highly emotional one, jurors might convict a doctor more on the
basis of their own beliefs rather than the evidence.88 It is also in-
teresting that of the five justices who agreed that the Court hadjurisdiction only three agreed that the statute was not vague.8 9
Except for Justices Harlan and Blackmun who felt there was nojurisdiction to hear the merits, but who decided the case on the
merits anyhow, the statute's constitutionality may have never been
87. ALA. CODE tit. 14 § 9 (1959) and D.C. CODE ANx. § 22-201 (1967).
However, the A.L.I. Model Penal Code proposal also contained an
exception allowing abortions to preserve the mental health of the
mother. See note 58 supra. Thus, potentially a finding of vagueness
would have had much wider implications.
88. 402 U.S. at 75.
89. The five Justices who held that there was jurisdiction to hear the
case were Justices Black, Burger, White, Stewart and Douglas. Of
this group, only Justices Black, Burger and White held that the stat-
u te was not vague.
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determined.90 The Court's decision in Vuitch to uphold the District
of Columbia abortion statute when silence was a feasible alternative
indicated to at least one commentator that the Supreme Court would
be unlikely to overturn abortion statutes on a privacy argument
thought to be based on a much shakier precedent.9 1
In addition to the abortion cases, the right of privacy articulated
in Griswold also gave rise to a challenge to the Massachusetts con-
traceptive laws which made it an offense, inter alia, to distribute
birth-control devices to unmarried persons. Although the Court
eventually ruled this statute unconstitutional in 1972 in Baird v.
Eisenstadt,92 it based its decision on equal protection rather than
the expanded right of privacy.9 3 Besides failing to enlarge the
scope of privacy in Baird, the Court had over the two terms prior to
Roe been limiting the domestic privacy concept either explicitly
or by implication, at least according to one commentator. 4  It is
with this background that the Supreme Court was faced with an ap-
peal from the district court of Texas challenging that state's abor-
tion law.
IV. ROE DECISION
Jane Roe,95 a single, pregnant woman, initiated a suit in March
1970 against a state district attorney seeking a declaratory judg-
90. Justice Stewart felt that if a doctor performed an abortion in good
faith, he should be immune from prosecution. 402 U.S. at 97. Al-
though there is no official indication of how Justices Marshall and
Brennan, who dissented as to jurisdiction, would have held on the
merits, one might assume they would have held the statute uncon-
stitutional.
91. Sigworth, Abortion Laws in the Federal Courts-The Supreme Court
as Supreme Platonic Guardian, 5 IND. LoAL FoRum 130, 134 (1971).
92. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
93. However, there was some expansion since the Court officially broke
away from the sanctity of marriage basis in Griswold and held that
privacy in matters of procreation was a personal right which belonged
to an individual, whether married or single.
94. Sigworth, supra note 91, at 136-40. This commentator, whose article
was based on the premise that all but the most permissive abortion
laws were undesirable, concluded from a survey of recent Supreme
Court decisions that the Court would not and should not be the body
to repeal restrictive abortion laws. The commentaor concluded by
saying:[B]oth sexes should think twice before entrusting the order-
Iag of priorities of their intimate lives, not to a tradition
which, though dying and riddled with injustice, has at times
inspired love and beauty; and not to the democratic process,
which at least offers the possibility that all can be heard; but
finally to the limited perceptions, without precedent and
without responsibility, of a "bevy of Platonic Guardians."
Id. at 142.
95. The name was a pseudonym.
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ment that the Texas abortion statute was unconstitutional and an
injunction restraining him from enforcing it. James Hubert Hall-
ford, a licensed physician, was allowed to intervene in Roe's action.
He alleged in his complaint that he had previously been arrested for
violations of the statute and that two such prosecutions were cur-
rently pending against him. John and Mary Doe,90 a married child-
less couple, with the wife not pregnant, filed a companion suit,
alleging that if the wife became pregnant she would wish to have
an abortion, and also sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The
district court in Texas held that while Roe and Hallford had stand-
ing, the Does did not and that while abstention was warranted with
respect to the injunctive relief,97 it was not with respect to the de-
claratory judgment.98 On the merits, the court held the statute
was vague and overbroad and was an unconstitutional infringement
on the plaintiffs' ninth amendment rights and it declared the statute
void.9 9 Appeal from the decision was made to the Supreme Court
pursuant to section 1253 of Title 28 of the United States Code'0 0
and a protective appeal was also made to the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. At this time the Supreme Court, as always, had
two choices; it could refuse to hear the case or it could hear the
case on the merits presented squarely with the privacy issue and
thus be compelled, at least according to Bickel, to give a principled
decision.
It is evident from examining the jurisdictional posture of the
case that there were several grounds by which the Court could
have avoided a decision on the merits, if it had so desired. First,
the appeals' 0 1 were from the granting of a declaratory judgment
and the denial of injunctive relief.10 2  Earlier cases' 0 3 held that
96. The names were pseudonyms.
97. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1224 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
98. Id. at 1220.
99. Id. at 1223.
100. Appeal was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1966) which provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may ap-
peal to the Supreme Court from an order granting or deny-
ing, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent
injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by
any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district
court of three judges.
101. The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford appealed the
denial of the injunction. The defendant district attorney purported
to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1966) the court's grant of declara-
tory relief.
102. The Court noted, "It might have been preferable if the defendant,
pursuant to our Rule 20, had presented to us a petition for certiorari
before judgment in the Court of Appeals with respect to the granting
of the plaintiff's prayer for declaratory relief." 410 U.S. at 123.
103. Gunn v. University Comm., 399 U.S. 383 (1970); Mitchell v. Donovan,
398 U.S. 427 (1970).
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section 1253, the basis for the appeal, does not allow appeal to the
Supreme Court from the granting or denial of declaratory relief
alone. Thus, theoretically at least, the Court could have limited
the appeal to whether the district court erred in abstaining from
hearing the question of injunctive relief and never reached the
merits of the case. Second, the Court held that Dr. Hallford and
the Does did not have standing to challenge the statute.10 4 Thus,
the only party left was Roe, a single woman who was pregnant
in May 1970 when the suit was instituted, but who obviously was
not subject to that pregnancy at the time of the decision. After the
decision in Baird v. Eisenstadt,10 5 it no longer made any difference
that Roe was not married, as the right of privacy in procreation had
been extended to individuals, whether married or single. Further-
more, that she was no longer pregnant could have evoked applica-
tion of the usual rule in federal cases that "an actual controversy
must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply
at the date the action is initiated."'1 6 Nevertheless, the Court noted
the long period of time the appellate process takes and the normal
266 day gestation period and concluded that "pregnancy provides
a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness.'- 0 7 The
Court refused to apply any of these technicalities to avoid the merits
and allow the colloquy to continue and instead went to the merits.
According to Bickel, the decision of the Court on a constitu-
tional adjudication must be based on an enduring principle, capable
of widespread acceptance, which has been ripened through a collo-
quy with the political institutions and society at large. Does the
decision in Roe meet these criteria?
Was the controversy ripe for adjudication and was the colloquy
complete? On one level, the colloquy had been completed. All the
information and arguments both for and against abortion legis-
lation had been aired throughout society. Although no consensus
was achieved, the public was as ready as it would ever be for a de-
104. 410 U.S. at 125-29. Dr. Hallford was unable to meet the require-
ments imposed by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its com-
panion cases, specifically Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
Younger held that absent a showing of harassment and bad faith, a
defendant in a pending state criminal case cannot affirmatively chal-
lenge in federal court the statutes under which he is being prose-
cuted. Since Mrs. Doe was not alleged to be pregnant, the Court
viewed the Does' position as speculative as far as being affected by
the statute and the mere allegations of so indirect an injury was in-
sufficient to present an actual case or controversy.
105. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See note 92 and accompanying text supra.
106. 410 U.S. at 125.
107. Id. at 125.
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cision by the Supreme Court. However, on another level the col-
loquy was not yet complete. Bickel warns that the Court should
not "dwarf the political capacity of the people" 0 8 when it can avoid
doing so. A great deal of legislative liberalization of abortion stat-
utes had occurred in recent years.109 In addition, voters in some
states such as Michigan and North Dakota had recently voted against
abortion reform.". 0 Thus, the political forces were at work. Even
the Roe division of pregnancy into trimesters had been discussed
in some of the lower court decisions and specifically implemented
in one of them."' It hardly seemed necessary for the Supreme
Court to take an active role in the colloquy as it was proceeding
actively throughout society. All of this effort was substantially
modified by the Roe decision. Thus, it appears that the nature of
the controversy was one particularly suited for resolution through
the political processes.
Was the decision on a principled basis? There are several state-
ments in Roe that could qualify as efforts to enunciate the appli-
cable principles: 1. the right to choose to have an abortion is a fun-
damental right, however, it is not absolute and is subject to state
regulation; 112 2. the interests that a state has in regulating abortion
are protection of the health of the mother and protection of the
"potential life" of the fetus and these interests become compell-
ing at different stages of the pregnancy; 1 3 3. the fetus is not en-
titled to protection until it has "the capability of meaningful life
outside the mother's womb."1 4 The net result was that the period
of pregnancy was divided into trimesters with various amounts of
regulation allowed.
Are the principles announced in Roe likely to gather the wide-
spread acceptance necessary for an enduring principle? It is well
recognized that the abortion question was and still is highly charged
with moral, ethical and emotional issues. It is unrealistic to expect
that those who firmly believe the fetus is a person are likely to
change their attitudes merely because the Court found the state was
unable to prove that a fetus is a person. Those who were in favor
of restrictive abortion legislation before the decision are, in fact, still
attempting to effectuate their views." 5 However, there are also
108. BICKEL, supra note 10, at 156.
109. See notes 59 and 60 supra.
110. Noonan, Raw Judicial Power, NAT'L REviEw, March 2, 1973, at 261.
111. Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
112. 410 U.S. at 154.
113. Id. at 162-64.
114. Id. at 163.
115. Noonan, supra note 110, at 264. Noonan suggests that there are two
lines of attack which those opposed to the abortion decision could
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many people in society who do not share these beliefs and who wel-
comed the Court's decision. Although the Court's decision must
take. First, the Court could be expanded from nine to fifteen mem-
bers. Second, the Constitution could be amended to provide pro-
tection for the unborn child. Noonan's proposed increase in the
number of justices would have the effect of overruling Roe, a 7-2
decision, only if all six of the new justices would vote to overrule.
The Nebraska Legislature recently enacted a new statutory scheme
regulating abortions in light of the Roe decision which provides pro-
tection for the "unborn child" as soon as it reaches viability. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-4,143 et. seq. (Supp. 1973). The new statutory scheme
is prefaced with a declaration of purpose which states:
The Legislature hereby finds and declares:(1) That the following provisions were motivated by the
legislative intrusion of the United States Supreme Court by
virtue of its decision removing the protection afforded the un-
born. Sections 28-4,143 to 28-4,164 are in no way to be con-
strued as implementing, condoning, or approving abortions
at any stage of unborn human development, but is rather an
expression of the will of the people of the State of Nebraska
and the members of the Legislature to provide protection for
the life of the unborn child whenever possible until such pro-
tection can be afforded by an appropriate amendment to the
the United States Constitution;(2) That the members of the Legislature expressly de-
plore the destruction of the unborn human lives which has
and will occur in Nebraska as a consequence of the Supreme
Court's decision on abortion;(3) That it is in the interest of the people of the State of
Nebraska that every precaution be taken to insure the pro-
tection of every viable unborn child being aborted, and every
precaution be taken to provide life-supportive procedures to
insure the unborn child its continued life after its abortion;(4) That currently, in this state, there are grossly inade-
quate legal remedies to protect the life, health, and welfare
of pregnant women and unborn human life; and(5) That it is in the interest of the people of the State of
Nebraska to maintain accurate statistical data to aid in pro-
viding proper maternal health regulations.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-4,143 (Supp. 1973).
There also is currently a controversy regarding abortions being
performed by some of the faculty at the University of Nebraska Med-
ical Center. Pursuant to the standards set forth in Roe several of the
faculty have performed abortions at the Medical Center. The Board
of Regents of the University of Nebraska reacted to these develop-
ments by adopting several resolutions on June 23, 1973, regulating
abortions at the Medical Center. One of these resolutions limited the
number of abortions that could be performed there to fifteen a week'
Another provided that if a full-time faculty member of the Obstetrical!
Gynecological Department performs abortions outside of the Uni-
versity Hospital, his employment at the Medical Center was subject
to termination. These resolutions have led to the recent filing of a
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska
by two faculty members who face dismissal. Orr v. Koefoot, Civil
No. 73-L-286 (D. Neb., filed Nov. 7, 1973). In their complaint, the
plaintiffs allege that the following comment was made by one of the
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be able to garner widespread acceptance, according to Bickel, it is
probably not essential that there be universal acceptance. If the
overwhelming majority held a certain belief, it is likely that the
change would be accomplished by means of legislative enactment.
Thus, it appears that the Roe decision was on a principled basis
and was able to garner sufficient acceptance to satisfy these Bickel-
ian requirements. However, in light of all the activity in society,
Bickel might argue that the decision dwarfed the political capacity
of the people and on this basis the Court should have avoided reach-
ing the merits. In addition, there may be yet another prudential
concern other than the need for widespread acceptance. The deter-
mination of a principle carries with it seeds for the future; in fact,
Bickel requires that the principled basis must be able to prevail and
endure. Consequently, the decision to announce a principle is one
that must be made only after careful consideration of its effect. On
this basis, the Court's decision in Roe is highly suspect.
The long-range goals embodied in the Roe principles are subject
to several interpretations. Possibly the Roe principles carry the
seeds of a movement toward population control. Perhaps future
applications of the Roe principles may result in a lessening of the
value of human life as it is now understood. The Court held that
until the fetus was capable of meaningful life outside the mother's
womb, the state could not prove it was a person entitled to consti-
tutional protection. How then can the state protect a deformed
baby or a terminally ill patient in a coma in the face of the argu-
ment that they are not capable of "meaningful life?" Of course,
the Roe decision may be interpreted as providing a rampart against
the increasing assault on the right of privacy and the right to lead
one's life as he wishes in the face of electronic spying devices, com-
puterization of every aspect of one's life and exploding urban cen-
ters. But if this were the "real" principle in the case, was Roe the
proper case to employ to erect this rampart given the other facets
of the case?
Ultimately, however, the real question arising from Roe is not
whether the colloquy as to abortion was properly ended by the
Court, but whether a new colloquy attempting to define life has
Regents at their meetings: "The Medical Center is not a mecca for
abortions. It's paid for by taxpayers ... by individuals completely
against abortion." Another Regent in proposing a complete pro-
hibition of abortions at the Medical Center allegedly stated that he
was personally opposed to abortions as were the people whom he
represented. This controversy is merely another indication that many
Americans continue to oppose the full implementation of Roe and
still favor restrictive abortion procedures.
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begun. One need not look too far into the future, with the trans-
plants of vital organs, possibly even brain transplants, and the crea-
tion of "life" from test tubes to ponder whether these "creations"
are "persons" entitled to constitutional protection. By its decision
in Roe, the Court necessarily, according to Bickel, gave these chal-
lenges a constitutional basis which they may have never otherwise
achieved and may have encouraged people to make arguments they
would not have made without this constitutional basis. Conse-
quently, Bickel would feel that the Supreme Court should have
refrained in Roe from making a constitutional adjudication.
